illustrate that participants make significantly faster, more retributive decisions for another when the offer is unfair, compared to the slower, more prosocial choices made for the self. Error bars indicate one standard error of the mean. B) Mean reaction times for the option to 'reverse' reveal that participants are significantly slower to be retributive when deciding for themselves compared to when deciding on behalf of another. ***p<0.001 ** p<0.01 Equity: This option reflects two motivations that are not mutually exclusive. First, the option to equally distribute the payouts ($5, $5) allows for a moderate amount of compensation for the victim and a moderate amount of punishment to be applied to the transgressor. This option allows participants to balance a desire to both compensate and punish. Second, in much the same way that 'compensating' distributes equal payouts to both players, the 'equity' option also controls for participants' putative aversion to inequality 3 .
Experiment 1 Choice Data
We plot the data for all unfair offer types ( Figure S1 ). Player As routinely offered highly unfair splits of ( ). Regardless of how unfair the offer from Player A is, Player Bs prefer to compensate and apply no punishment to Player A. Table S1 delineates the endorsement of each option compared to every other option for each offer type (pairwise comparisons). For example, for a ( ) split, participants chose to compensate 99% of the time when the other presented option was equity, 99% when the other option presented was accept, 100% when the other option presented was punish, and 65% of the time when other option presented was reverse.
Experiment 1 Strategies
After finishing the experiment, we asked all participants to describe in their own words their strategy used during the game. Below we include a handful of representative comments from Player A.
 "I always selected the highest payoff for me."  "I felt kinda bad doing $1 for B, so I did $2. I was hoping by not giving the absolute minimum they would show mercy to me if they to choose between lowering my pay or accepting the offer."  "Max payout for myself"  "I gave B as little as possible and hoped B's options were in my favor"
Below we include a handful of representative comments from Player B.
 "I always chose the profitable option while trying not to hurt Player A"  "I picked the option that was best for both of us, unless I was going to make a significantly less amount than the other player"  "I picked whichever gave me the most money while also trying to benefit role A if I could"  "I was Player B, so usually I selected the option that benefited [sic] ), participants' preferences also depended on what type of offer they received. As the offer became increasingly unfair, participants preferentially chose to 'reverse' the outcomes, an option that simultaneously compensates themselves and punishes Player A. When deciding for another (Other condition), participants exhibit similar behavior for most offer types (( ) splits -( ) splits). However, when the offer became highly unfair ( ) participants shifted their behavior remarkably, such that the 'reverse' option became the most preferred response (Fig S3B) .
Directly comparing responses between the Self and Other condition for relatively fair offers ($.60, $.40) compared to highly unfair offers ( ) reveals differential behavior across the two conditions, such that participants chose the most retributive option ('reverse') significantly more when deciding for another when the offer is highly unfair (see manuscript for analysis).
However, directly comparing responses between the 'Self' and 'Other' conditions for $.60, $.40
and $.70, $.30 offers, illustrate remarkably similar results between the two conditions (X 2 =4.0, 4df, p=.40). This suggests then when presented with relatively fair offers, participants appear to process these offers in a relatively similar fashion for both themselves and others.
Experiments 3-6 Reaction Time Data
To help understand the cognitive mechanisms underlying choice behavior to restore justice, we examined the speed (reaction times) with which participants made their choices in Experiments 3-6. Because analyzing reaction time data in a between group design has many pitfalls, including difficulties in interpreting individual differences at the group level (e.g. it is not clear which particular processes are contributing to any observed group differences 19 ), we did not analyze reaction times in Experiments 1 and 2. Since participants completed both the Self and Other conditions in Experiments 3-6, we were able to directly compare the speed in which choices were made for the self compared to those made for others. Because we did not limit participants' decision time, reaction times were right-skewed. To help normalize the data for subsequent analyses, we log-transformed (base 10) all reaction times.
First, we expected that the severity of the fairness violation would affect the speed at which choices were made. In line with this, we found a main effect of offer type, such that as Player A's offer became increasingly unfair, participants responded faster (repeated measures ANOVA Fig S5A) . Second, we also expected to see a difference in response times for choices made for the self compared to those made for others. It is possible that decisions involving personal benefit or loss (Self condition) are associated with greater automaticity, and thus are made more quickly than those made on behalf of another. It is also possible, however, that choices made for the self are more personally consequential, requiring greater deliberation and reflection, and are thus made more slowly than the non-consequential choices made for others. Analysis revealed that participants were quicker to decide for another significantly faster than those for the self, it is possible that choosing to compensate requires greater deliberation than when deciding to punish. Thus, in order to control for response type,
we directly compared whether retributive choices for others were also made more quickly than retributive choices for the self. In line with this, we found that decisions to 'reverse' the payouts on behalf of another were made significantly faster (1.99s SD±.75) than the same decision for the self (2.11s SD±.69: t(474)=2.56, p=0.01, Fig S7B) . Participants were slower to punish the transgressor after directly experiencing a fairness violation.
Countering the classic notion that third-parties-e.g. juries-respond in a more reflective, deliberative manner, this data suggests that endorsing punishment on behalf of another is actually associated with a faster, more automatic process, compared to when personally responding to a fairness violation. In other words, despite the conventional wisdom that we are more deliberative and thoughtful when acting on behalf of wronged others 20 , instead we find that such choices are less deliberative. In addition, that retributive responses were associated with greater automaticity, dovetails with existing work indicating that emotion related processes play a guiding role in driving punishment 21, 22 .
Caveats
It is possible that some participants believed that the most fiscally beneficial move is for Player A to offer a ( ) split. If Player B then chooses to 'compensate', both players can maximize their payouts by each making $.90. In other words, joint payoff is maximized if Player A makes an initial unfair offer, and Player B then chooses to compensate him or herself and not apply any punishment to Player A. From this perspective, the wisest strategic move is for Player A to always offer the most unfair split and anything less than a ( ) split should be construed as leaving 'money on the table'. If this is indeed a strategy that participants employed while playing the task, then all other offers ( ) ( ) should be punished at a higher rate than a ( ) split, and participants should not display any punitive behavior when offered a ( ) split.
Contrary to this, participants' responded with increasingly punitive and retaliatory behavior as the offer became increasingly unfair. However, to check whether participants were operating under this assumption, we debriefed participants at the end of the task and asked them to describe their strategies. Participants' comments during debriefing do not suggest that they believed Player A was acting strategically by offering a highly unfair split (see debriefing section below). Given these factors, it is unlikely that the lack of punishment towards Player A can be explained by participants engaging in the task from the perspective that ( ) is the most strategic, lucrative, and optimal first move.
Experiments 2-6 Strategies
We asked participants to describe in their own words their strategy for when Player A offered a $.60, $.10 split to them, and to another Player B, and also their strategy for when Player A offered a $.90, $.10 split to them, and to another Player B. This allowed us to explore how participants perceived the intentions of Player A, and to comment on their thought process when deciding to reapportion the payouts. Below we provide a representative sample of the participants' comments for highly unfair and relatively fair splits when they were Player B and when they were Player C. Participants' comments indicate that when Player A offered a $.90, $.10 split, participants genuinely felt that it was unfair and not a strategic first move. In fact, none of the 898 participants indicated that a $.90, $.10 split was an optimal first move that could maximize all Players' fiscal payout. Given this, we are confident that participants were not interpreting Player A's highly unfair offers as an intention to be cooperative by maximizing the Players' payouts.
Question: In your words please describe your strategy for a scenario when Player A kept $.90 and offered $.10 to you.  "Instead of tumbling into a vindictive wonderland and punishing A severely, I took the opportunity to make major bank while keeping the playing field even"  "I tried to understand the other person's perspective and tried to equalize by giving both of us .90 instead of focusing on the punishment"  "I was slightly offended by this, but rather than punish player A, I thought it would be more civil to cut the sum evenly in half."  "This is totally unfair and I would overturn the decision, but instead of punishing Player A I would allow for both of us to receive $0.90."  "Feel that A should be punished and would want to reverse the roles, however, they have already played, it is better to give everyone equal and higher money than anyone less."  "That was extremely unfair, so I tried to make it more fair -and even."  "Selfishness shouldn't [sic] be rewarded"  "I was interested in teaching by example. Just because someone was unfair to me doesn't mean I had to be unfair back."  "That is very unfair to me --it's pretty bad --shame on player A!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!" Question: In your words please describe your strategy for a scenario when Player A kept $.90 and offered $.10 to another Player B (when you were Player C).  "I wasn't going to sit around and watch inequality happen, so I choose to eradicate A's advantage/privilege and bringing B up to A's level, so there'd be no income gap/poweradvantage. It adds more throughput in the economy, and when I'm B I'd find that a pleasant surprise"  "Its not up to me to forgive player A"  "That was unfair, and I wanted to reverse it so the other player got the unfair payment."  "Player

SUPPLEMENTARY METHODS
Experiment 1 Protocol
At the start of each trial in Experiment 1 neither Player A nor Player B knew which options would be made available to Player B on that trial. Randomly pairing the options on each trial such that the option to compensate was not always available prevents Player A from believing that a $9/1 offer is the most optimal and beneficial first move for both Player A and Player B.
That is, a $9/1 split can only be considered optimal if Player A knows that Player B has the option to compensate. With this framework, Player A cannot rely on a strategy that offering a $9/1 split maximizes both participants' payouts. Additionally, this dynamic simulates a more naturalistic setting, where people in real world situations typically do not have full information on how others will respond to their choices.
Participants were also told that one trial would be randomly selected by the computer to be paid out. Half the time the trial would be paid out according to the decision of Player B on that trial, and half of the time the computer would treat the trial like a dictator game such that the randomly selected trial would be paid out according to the split suggested by Player A. This payout structure was added so that Player B would know that 50% of the time Player A could maximize their own payout irrespective of Player B's decisions, and to minimize fair offers from Player As. Given that 50% of the trials would be paid out as dictator games, Player As should employ a strategy that will maximize their payouts (a selfish strategy). In addition to the $10
show up fee, participants were able to make an additional payout based on their and their partners' choices (up to $9). Finally, participants were told that during a given experimental session, they would play against many other players in the room, and that on each round (70 rounds in total) they would be paired with a different partner, therefore they should treat each round as a new interaction.
The experimenter read the following instructions out loud to all participants: 
Experiments 2-6 Protocol
Amazon Mechanical Turk
Participants were recruited for these experiments using the online labour market Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). AMT is an online market in which "employers" can pay "workers" to complete relatively short tasks for small amounts of money. In our experiments, our participants ("workers") received a baseline non-waivable payment of $0.50, in addition to which they could receive a bonus depending on their choices. In other words, participants were incentivized to report their real preferences as one of their choices would be realized and paid out.
One benefit of AMT is that it provides a subject pool that is typically much more diverse than the subject pools available at most American universities 11 -including variation across age, ethnicity, and socio-economic status-ultimately providing a more representative sample of the true population. In an initial pilot study we recruited participants from around the world.
However, we discovered through the online debriefing portion of the experiment-where participants were asked to write down their choice strategies-that task comprehension was often poor. To ensure a high level of data quality (e.g. from participants who completely understood the task), we decided to restrict our recruitment to participants based in the United
States.
The use of AMT presents some potential concerns not otherwise present in laboratory settings.
To address these concerns, a number of studies have explored the validity of data gathered on AMT. Across multiple domains, the behavior reported from AMT participants parallels the behavior found in laboratory participants, indicating the validity and reliability of AMT data [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] .
In fact, even economic games run on AMT that use stakes 10-fold lower than those run within the laboratory demonstrate similar behavioral results 13, 14 .
Amazon Mechanical Turk Procedure
While each of the five experiments was slightly different (see below), all the experiments began with a similar set of instructions. When explaining the rules of the game, the instructions explicitly framed offers as fair and unfair. This was done for two reasons. First, in order to make sure that online Mturkers were aware of what a fairness violation was, and second to minimize how participants interpreted the offers.
Instructions for Experiments 2-6
" 
